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Abstract
Medical devices are essential tools for modern healthcare delivery. However, significant issues can arise if medical devices
are designed for ‘work as imagined’ when this is misaligned with ‘work as done’. This problem can be compounded as the
details of device design, in terms of usability and the way a device supports or changes working practices, often receives
limited attention. The ways devices are designed and used affect patient safety and quality of care: inappropriate design
can provoke user error, create system vulnerabilities and divert attention from other aspects of patient care. Current
regulation involves a series of pre-market checks relating to device usability, but this assumes that devices are always used
under the conditions and for the purposes intended (i.e. work as imagined); there are many reasons for devices being
used in ways other than those assumed at development time. Greater attention needs to be paid to learning points in
actual use and user experience (i.e. work as done). This needs to inform manufacturers’ designs, management procure-
ment decisions and local decisions about how devices are used in practice to achieve co-adaptation; without these, we
foster risks and inefficiencies in healthcare.
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Introduction
There is a growing recognition of the importance of
human factors in healthcare delivery, particularly
since the publication of the Francis and Berwick
Reports.1,2 Human factors take a broad approach to
improving the performance of systems of people, pro-
cesses, products and policies. Thanks to successes in
aviation, Crew Resource Management (CRM) has
been strongly associated with human factors, which
has been highlighted for use in health care.3 However,
human factors cover more than training and teamwork.
We aim to raise awareness of another signiﬁcant aspect
of human factors that has received less attention in
health care: the design and use of interactive medical
devices.
Devices are playing an increasingly important role in
the delivery of care, whether in monitoring vital signs,
medication administration, analgesia or delivering spe-
cialist treatments. However, many interactive medical
devices are diﬃcult to use, and the assumptions that
were made at the time of design, and on which
regulatory checks were based, often sit uncomfortably
with actual clinical practice (i.e. work as imagined is
diﬀerent from work as done4). In this article, we high-
light the importance of going beyond evaluation of
usability to ensuring that device design and use are
aligned, so that systems are ﬁt for purpose in practice.
Our focus is on interactive devices that are used by
people with a variety of backgrounds, such as infusion
pumps and glucometers.
Usability: Between user error and device error
Like all tools, medical devices are typically ‘invisible’
except when something goes wrong, most notably in an
untoward incident. When an incident involves a device,
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it is most commonly categorised as either user error or
device error. The cause of an incident is normally
classed as a device error if there is some fault in hard-
ware or software. If the device performed as designed
then user error is assumed: the problem must be some-
thing to do with training, inattention, incompetence or
failure to read instructions. This simple attribution as
either user error or device error fails to raise questions
about the suitability of the design itself, and whether
design and use are misaligned. Usability and ﬁtness for
purpose lie in the interaction between the user, the
device and the context of use.
Many interactive medical devices pose usability chal-
lenges, and such diﬃculties can contribute to incidents
involving serious harm.5 For example, Denise
Melanson died following an incident in which an infu-
sion pump was programmed to deliver over 4 h medi-
cation that should have been delivered over four days.
The report on her death6 includes a brief summary (p.
63) of a subsequent usability test of the infusion pump
involved in that incident. That usability test aimed to
replicate the situation as closely as possible, and
involved qualiﬁed nurses. Three of the ﬁve made pro-
gramming errors, and all experienced diﬃculties inter-
acting with the device. This was not the only factor
contributing to the incident, but nevertheless was iden-
tiﬁed as being signiﬁcant in this and several other ‘simi-
lar’ incidents. The design of interactive medical devices
contributes to their ease of use, to the likelihood of
people making mistakes with them, and hence to
patient safety.
In 2001, a Panel on Transforming Healthcare report
to the US President called for ‘‘research on user-inter-
face hardware and software to promote the develop-
ment of better solutions to the problem of human
computer interaction in healthcare’’.7 Usability evalu-
ation forms part of the human factors, or usability
engineering, process outlined in international standard
62366.8 Along with Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) draft HF guidance9 and design principles such
as HE75,10 they summarise best practice in ‘‘usability
engineering’’. However, usability engineering as part of
pre-market approval is necessary but not suﬃcient for
ensuring ﬁtness for purpose in practice.
Usability in practice
Usability is not an abstract concept independent of
context: a device may be poorly designed for the way
it is being used. For example, frequently used functions
may be diﬃcult to access and less frequently used ones
easier, typically because actual use is diﬀerent to that
envisaged by the manufacturer. In a study of the use of
infusion devices in an intensive care unit (ICU),
Rajkomar and Blandford11 noted that volume reset
was used frequently, but could only be accessed by
navigating deep into the menu hierarchy: ‘‘Every
hour, to record the hourly intake of a drug with the
volumetric pump, the nurse needs to access a Status
menu from the Main Menu of the pump interface,
choose an Intermediate Parameters option, read the
volume infused, and then reset the counter to zero.
The operation takes 8 key presses’’. Such a mismatch
between local practices and the design (or conﬁgur-
ation) of the medical device may not be inherently
error-prone, but it adds to staﬀ workload in an already
stressful environment and draws attention away from
the core task of patient care.
Another kind of diﬃculty emerges in the ‘‘unremark-
able errors’’ observed by Furniss et al.12: these are little,
every-day errors that clinicians barely regard as errors
because they are minor and are quickly recovered from.
However, these are commonly a source of frustration
and could escalate if they are not caught; they draw
attention away from other aspects of clinical work.
For example, on some infusion devices, it is easy to
insert the decimal point in the wrong place, which
could result in an ‘out by ten’ error13: constant vigilance
is needed while programming the device to detect and
correct any such data entry errors. Each small correc-
tion takes little time, but aggregated over thousands of
interactions they add up to signiﬁcant time taken from
direct patient care, and to a more signiﬁcant risk of
having errors pass undetected.
One important way in which poor ﬁt becomes appar-
ent is identifying workarounds in use. Workarounds
have been widely reported in healthcare, including in
the use of devices. For example, Koppel et al.14 identi-
ﬁed various workarounds in the use of a barcode medi-
cation administration system, such as placing barcodes
on objects in the environment rather than attaching
them to the patient, while Furniss et al.15 noted an ‘oﬃ-
cial’ workaround that has been established in the use of
a particular glucometer: namely the use of 2222 or 9999
as the patient identiﬁer if someone has not yet been
allocated a patient number. Workarounds typically
arise because, in the here-and-now of work, they oﬀer
a timely solution to delivering care, and they are over-
coming some mismatch between the design and the
needs of use.
Sometimes, devices are used for purposes for which
they were never designed. When people cannot ﬁnd the
right tool for a job, they may use another tool to
achieve their purpose. When devices are appropriated
for uses for which they were not designed, this intro-
duces vulnerabilities into the system. This is illustrated
by the case reported by Grissinger16 of a neonatal baby
who received milk intravenously. The baby was being
fed through a nasogastric tube, using a syringe driver to
regulate the ﬂow of milk; this is not a use for which the
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device had been designed. Indeed, the baby was also
receiving medication intravenously via an identical
pump: a use for which it was designed. At some
point, ‘‘a nurse mistakenly connected a syringe contain-
ing breast milk to the wrong line’’.16 Many factors may
have contributed to this incident (workload, multi-task-
ing, availability of equipment, etc.), but the confusabil-
ity of the pumps and their tubing, and the fact that the
pump was being used for a purpose for which it was not
designed, were factors that made the mistake more
likely and less easy to detect, and the consequences
could have been fatal. Consideration needs to be
given to whether the tasks that need to be done can
be achieved safely using the available tools.
As others17 have noted, workarounds often become
normalized in clinical practice, despite the fact that
many of them introduce vulnerabilities into the
system by eroding safety mechanisms (e.g. increasing
the risk of patient misidentiﬁcation or confusability of
devices, or circumventing safety checks that were
designed to catch errors).18
As Debono et al.17 note, senior managers are often
unaware of workarounds; also, staﬀ themselves typic-
ally do not question ineﬃcient interactions and unre-
markable errors. These work practices are semi-tacit:
people are loosely aware of them if they are pointed
out, but would not think to mention them if asked dir-
ectly about them. Practices and ways of managing them
need to be reviewed to ensure that they are not intro-
ducing unnecessary vulnerabilities into the system of
use. The most eﬀective way of identifying these prac-
tices is through observation by an ‘outsider’ for whom
these practices are not taken-for-granted knowledge
and who is experienced in studying clinical work and
people’s interactions with technology.
Aligning device design and use
At development time, manufacturers have to make
assumptions about how their devices will be used in
order to construct the safety argument that the device
is market-ready. However, as illustrated above, actual
clinical practice diverges from the assumptions that are
made at development time in many ways, and for vari-
ous reasons. Thus, the basis for the safety argument
that was made during pre-market checks may no
longer be valid. There is a need to review actual clinical
practice and the ﬁtness for purpose of devices in sup-
porting that practice, as a form of post-market evalu-
ation.15 This would be typical in other industries: for
example using a safety management system and safety
case documentation. The latter would involve periodic
review to assure that safety goals are being achieved.19
While basic usability can be tested away from the
intended context of use (e.g. through the use of expert
assessment and user trials),20 ﬁtness for purpose can
only be assessed by understanding clinical needs and
practices and checking the quality of ﬁt between devices
and practices. The quality of ﬁt can be improved
through careful selection of devices to match needs,
or by working closely with clinical teams to ensure
that practices evolve to match the assumptions embo-
died within design; typically, good ﬁt may be achieved
through a combination of these approaches.
The purchasing process for medical technology rep-
resents one opportunity for optimising this ﬁt, by
taking account of human factors for equipment and
of current clinical practices so as to reduce risk.21
Good human factors can save money22 as well as
improving safety.23 However, the story does not end
with purchasing. Further decisions are made about
how devices are conﬁgured and the protocols for clin-
ical use. These decisions should be made (and reviewed)
with a view to optimising patient safety and patient
care. This may include reviewing how devices are
used; how information from devices is recorded in
patient notes; under what circumstances devices are
set to sound an audible alarm (so as to minimise
alarm fatigue and unnecessary disruption to patients);
how device maintenance is managed so as to maximise
availability; how staﬀ are authorised to use a device; the
integration with wider health IT systems; etc.
Fitness should also be monitored as contexts and
needs change. Recently issued guidance by the UK
MHRA24 contains the following checks: ‘‘were there
any problems in using this device which should be
noted and could be ﬁxed in the future?’’, and ‘‘Is the
equipment still appropriate in the light of the patient or
client’s changing needs?’’ These checks recognise the
need to continually monitor usage, to check for safety
and improve the ﬁt to the circumstances in which
equipment is being used.
In this article, we have drawn on examples of poor
usability and poor ﬁtness for purpose to illustrate the
points being made. Each example might be dismissed as
a one-oﬀ. However, such diﬃculties are pervasive in
modern healthcare, and each compromises patient
safety in a small way. By attending to and eliminating
diﬃculties, many small gains that together yield sub-
stantial improvements in patient safety can be achieved.
In summary, human factors has an important role to
play in device design and use, and usability testing as
part of pre-market approval is necessary but not suﬃ-
cient. The complexity of health service practice makes it
impossible to anticipate every possible situation in
which devices are used; further, funding limitations in
healthcare may make it impossible to design explicitly
for every eventuality. Improved safety requires co-
adaption of technology, i.e. continual reﬁnement and
review, likely to involve those using equipment as well
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as those supplying it. Usability and ﬁtness for purpose
should be a focus during procurement, conﬁguration,
deployment and use; patient safety can be improved
through regular review of needs, practices and designs
to ensure that device design and use is aligned with
clinical practice.
Funding
This work has been funded by the CHIþMED project
(www.chi-med.ac.uk) EPSRC Grant EP/G059063/01.
Conflict of interest
The author declares that there is no conﬂict of interest.
References
1. Francis R. Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS founda-
tion trust public inquiry: executive summary. Vol. 947.
London: The Stationery Office, 2013.
2. Berwick D. Berwick review into patient safety. https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/berwick-review-
into-patient-safety (2013, accessed 9 October 2014).
3. Crowch CT. Making the healthcare system truly ‘error
tolerant’. Clin Risk 2008; 14(4): 127–129.
4. Hollnagel E. Why WAI is different from WAD. In:
Presented at the third resilience health care net meeting,
Middlefart, Denmark, 12–14 August 2014.
5. Fairbanks R and Wears R. Hazards with medical
devices: the role of design. Ann Emerg Med 2008; 52:
519–521.
6. ISMP Canada. Fluorouracil incident root cause analysis.
http://www.ismp-canada.org/download/reports/
FluorouracilIncidentMay2007.pdf (2007, accessed 9
October 2014).
7. President’s Information Technology Advisory
Committee. Transforming healthcare through infor-
mation technology. www.nitrd.gov/pubs/pitac/pitac-hc-
9feb01.pdf (2001, accessed 9 October 2014).
8. IEC. Medical devices – application of usability engineering
to medical devices. 62366. Geneva: International
Electrotechnical Commission, 2007.
9. FDA. Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and
Drug Administration Staff – applying human factors
and usability engineering to optimize medical device
design. http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Device
RegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/
ucm259748.htm (accessed 9 October 2014).
10. AAMI. HE75: Human factors engineering – design of
medical devices. Arlington, VA: AAMI, 2009.
11. Rajkomar A and Blandford A. Understanding infusion
administration in the ICU through distributed cognition.
J Biomed Inform 2012; 45: 580–590.
12. Furniss D, Blandford A and Mayer A. Unremarkable
errors: low-level disturbances in infusion pump use. In:
Proceedings of the 25th BCS conference on human com-
puter interaction (HCI-2011), Newcastle Upon Tyne,
UK, 4–8 July 2011, pp.197–204.
13. Vincent C. Guidelines for number entry interface design
(infusion devices). Technical report IP003. http://
www.chi-med.ac.uk/researchers/bibdetail-db.php?
PPnum¼IP003 (last updated 9 August 2013).
14. Koppel R, Wetterneck T, Telles JL, et al. Workarounds
to barcode medication administration systems: their
occurrences, causes, and threats to patient safety. J Am
Med Inform Assoc 2008; 15(4): 408–423.
15. Furniss D, Masci P, Curzon P, et al. 7 Themes for guid-
ing situated ergonomic assessments of medical devices: a
case study of an inpatient glucometer. Appl Ergon. Epub
ahead of print 20 June 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.apergo.2014.05.012
16. Grissinger M. Preventing accidental infusion of breast
milk in neonates. Pharm Ther 2010; 35(3): 127.
17. Debono D, Greenfield D, Black D, et al. Workarounds:
straddling or widening gaps in the safe delivery of health-
care. In Proceedings of the 7th international conference in
Organisational Behaviour in Health Care (OBHC),
Birmingham, UK, 11–14 April 2010.
18. Nemeth CP, Brown J, Crandall B, et al. The mixed bless-
ings of smart infusion devices and health care IT. Mil
Med 2014; 179(8S): )– 4–10.
19. The Health Foundation. Using safety cases in industry
and healthcare http://tinyurl.com/chwg3a3 (accessed 25
August 2014).
20. Wiklund ME (ed). Medical device and equipment design:
usability engineering and ergonomics. Boca Raton: CRC
Press, 1995.
21. Hinrichs S. A systems approach to improving patient
safety through medical device purchasing. https://www.
repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/238973 (2009, acces-
sed 10 October 2014).
22. Gandillon R. Infusion pump reliability and usability:
veteran’s health administration examines differences
between manufacturers. J Clin Eng 2013; 38(1): 27–31.
23. Nemeth C, Nunnally M, Bitan Y, et al. Between choice
and chance: the role of human factors in acute care equip-
ment decisions. J Patient Saf 2009; 5(2): 114–121.
24. MHRA. Devices in practice: checklists for using medical
devices. http://www.mhra.gov.uk/home/groups/dts-bs/
documents/publication/con007424.pdf (2014, accessed
25 August 2014).
110 Clinical Risk 20(5)
 at University College London on March 6, 2015cri.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
